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I. INTRODUCTION
The Equal Pay Act states that no employer shall discriminate on the
basis of sex by paying employees of opposite sexes different wages for
equal work on jobs that require near identical skill, effort, and
responsibility, and are performed under equal working conditions.1
Although Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act fifty-two years ago, the
wage gap still exists today.2 The wage gap has become a statistical
indicator that is used to measure the status of women’s wages compared to
men’s; the most current data from 2014 shows that women earned 78.6
percent as much as their male counterparts.3 Often employers reason that
the gender wage gap spurs from the life choices women make, the degrees

1. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2007) (detailing the rules and regulations for
employers concerning equal pay for employees regardless of their sex).
2. See Christianne Corbett & Catherin Hill, Graduating to a Pay Gap: The
Earnings of Women and Men One Year after College Graduation, THE AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION
OF
UNIVERSITY
WOMEN,
2
(2012),
http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/graduating-to-a-pay-gap-the-earnings-of-womenand-men-one-year-after-college-graduation.pdf (asserting that one third of the pay gap
between men and women is still unexplained).
3. See Gender Wage Gap Again Narrows Slightly, Remains Statistically
Unchanged, NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, http://www.pay-equity.org (last
visited Jan. 3, 2016) (noting that the wage gap only narrowed by 0.3 of a percent from
2013 to 2014).
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they choose to pursue, and the job fields they enter into.4 Employers often
blame the gender wage gap on a woman’s choice to have children;
however, a man’s decision to start a family frequently has no impact on his
salary or career.5
While these fallacies exist to provide society with a reason for the wage
gap, employers’ explanations tend to cover up a much uglier truth: women
face a seven percent wage disparity immediately after graduating college.6
All factors accounted for, and ten years after graduation, full-time female
workers were found to have a 12 percent unexplained difference in their
earnings compared to equally situated males.7 This evidence proves that
even between equally qualified and educated men and women, men
continue to earn more than their female counterparts in most fields.8
While statistics alone provide a bleak outlook on the gender wage gap,
court decisions set an even gloomier stage.9 Once a plaintiff makes out a
prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, the burden then shifts to
employers to justify the lower wage through one or more affirmative
defenses, including a seniority system, a merit system, a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a differential
based on any “factor other than sex.”10 Court opinions often find that the
4. See The Simple Truth About the Gender Pay Gap, THE AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION
OF
UNIVERSITY
WOMEN,
8
(2015),
http://www.aauw.org/files/2015/02/The-Simple-Truth_Spring-2015.pdf (noting that
women go into lower paying professions, such as teaching, making up for part of the
wage gap).
5. See id. (describing that employers are less likely to hire mothers compared to
childless women, and when employers do make an offer to a mother, they offer her a
lower salary than they do childless women).
6. See id. at 8 (detailing that after accounting for college major, occupation,
economic sector, hours worked, months unemployed since graduation, GPA, type of
undergraduate institution, institution selectivity, age, geographical region, and marital
status, a seven percent difference in the earnings of male and female college graduates
one year after graduation was still unexplained).
7. See The Simple Truth About the Gender Wage Gap, supra note 4, at 8, 9
(stating that a wage gap still remains between men and women whose education and
career paths are the same because men are more willing to negotiate their starting
salaries).
8. See Corbett, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that among business majors, women
earned just over $38,000, while men earned just over $45,000, showing a vast pay
discrepancy).
9. See E.E.O.C. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 249 (2d Cir. 2014)
(dismissing a case when similarly situated female attorneys with the same job title as
their male counter parts failed to prove their claim of unequal pay as plausible, rather
than possible).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(2007) (explaining the affirmative defenses available
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differential based on any “factor other than sex” is a theoretical catchall
where employers find arbitrary ways to justify a woman’s lower pay.11
Therefore, courts have concluded that to successfully establish a “factor
other than sex” defense, an employer must prove that it had a legitimate
business reason for implementing the gender-neutral factor that resulted in
the pay difference.12 Although courts tend to find more frequently for
employers in disparate pay cases, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) continues to represent women who are discriminated
against in the workforce; in 2011, monetary awards for sex based
discrimination cases resolved through the EEOC totaled just over $145
million.13
This Comment argues that the Equal Pay Act has not resulted in the
change it meant to implement, and the continuing wage disparity between
men and women proves this. Part II of this Comment summarizes the
various approaches different circuits take to resolve Equal Pay Act claims,
especially in relation to the affirmative defenses employers are allowed, as
well as modification of the elements necessary for a prima facie Equal Pay
Act case, and the effect that the Iqbal and Twombly possibility versus
plausibility paradox has had on Equal Pay Act claims.14 Part III argues that
circuits should follow the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit’s substantially
equal definition to evaluate Equal Pay Act claims, that the original
language “comparable character” that was previously in the Equal Pay Act
should be reenacted so as to allow for more successful Equal Pay Act
claims, and that the affirmative defenses, especially the “factor other than
sex,” should be strictly monitored by the courts so as to prevent arbitrary
dismissal of Equal Pay Act claims.15 Part IV concludes that the Equal Pay
Act was meant to implement equal wages for men and women employed in
similarly situated positions, and that courts should mirror the Second and
to employers who pay a woman less than a man).
11. See Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
Long Island Railroad’s use of policies for implementing a lower pay wage for a female
employer could rationally be found as gender-based discrimination).
12. See E.E.O.C. v. J.C. Penny Co., 843 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that the
“factor other than sex” defense does not include “literally any other factor,” but a factor
that, at a minimum, was adopted for a legitimate business reason).
13. See Corbett, supra note 2, at 11 (documenting that in 2011 the EEOC received
more than 28,000 complaints of sex discrimination, including wage disparities, which
is an increase of about 18 percent compared with a decade earlier).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III (arguing that the terminology of the Equal Pay Act should be
changed from “equal” to “comparable” to allow for more claims to survive dismissal
and to help circuits come to a more uniform consensus of the meaning of the Equal Pay
Act and how to evaluate claims that fall under it).
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Fifth Circuits’ approaches to appropriately address and evaluate Equal Pay
Act claims so as to reduce the gender wage gap.16
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Prima Facie Elements of an Equal Pay Act Claim
To prove a violation of the Equal Pay Act a plaintiff must first establish
a prima facie case of discrimination by showing the following: the
employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex; the
employees perform equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and
responsibility; and the jobs are performed under similar working
conditions.17 Much confusion still exists as to the meaning of the word
“equal” within the act, and contradictory judgments often result from the
interpretation of the word.18 The Equal Pay Act states
No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . on the basis of sex by paying
wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and
19
which are performed under similar working conditions.

1. Equal Effort, Responsibility, and Skill
The Fifth Circuit Equal Pay Act cases provide the fairest and most
correct evaluation of equal work for equal pay.20 The Fifth Circuit
compared male and female sales persons job responsibilities and pay by
citing to two cases that address the same factual issue but resulted in
16. See infra Part IV (concluding that for the Equal Pay Act to effectively help
employees who are suffering from unequal pay due to their gender, courts must resolve
the meaning of equal, define exactly what “factors other than sex” consist of, and more
justly adjudicate the plausibility verses possibility standard).
17. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 189 (1974) (stating the
elements of a prima facie case for an Equal Pay Act claim to make it clear for plaintiffs
bringing suit).
18. See Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1973) (stating
that although the standard of equality is clearly meant to be taken as higher than mere
comparability, and as lower than absolutely identical, there still remains an area of
equality under the Equal Pay Act which is ambiguous, especially in relation to “equal
skill, effort, and responsibility”).
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963).
20. See Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 1970)
(asserting that males and females should have been paid the same amount for doing
equal work).
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conflicting decisions.21 While deciding an Equal Pay Act claim, the Sixth
Circuit discussed the meaning of equal work for equal pay, finding that
both male and female employees’ work was equal since they both cared for
patients, bathed patients, distributed food trays, fed patients, took
temperatures, and changed clothes and bed linens, and thus should have
been compensated with equal pay.22 The Third Circuit also found that
female aides and male orderlies performed equal work and deserved equal
pay.23
However, the Tenth Circuit found that an issue of material fact existed as
to whether a female employee’s work was substantially equal to that of
male employees.24 The court decided that a trier of fact could conclude that
the female employee was simply more efficient, upholding a more lenient
standard of substantially equal work.25
2. Interpreting the Meaning of ‘Equal’
As guidance for equal work, the Fifth Circuit noted that jobs do not
entail equal effort, even though they entail most of the same routine
duties.26 If the more highly paid job includes additional tasks which (1)
require extra effort, (2) consume a significant amount of time of all those
whose pay differentials are to be justified in terms of them, and (3) are an
21. See Brennan, 479 F.2d at 239 (comparing Schultz v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp.,
305 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Tex. 1969), rev’d sub nom. Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen.
Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970) (male orderly’s position equal to that of female
aide) with Hodgson v. Good Shepard Hosp., 327 F. Supp. 143, 144 (E.D. Texas 1971)
(male orderly position not equal to female maid) to show that courts interpret the
meaning of “equal” differently in similar cases).
22. See Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 250 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that
Congress did not intend the phrase “equal work” to require that the jobs be identical,
but rather that only substantial equality of skill, effort, responsibility, and working
conditions is required).
23. See Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding
that there are problems of construction with the Equal Pay Act’s language and that
legislative history and the bills that preceded it yield little guidance in the
understanding of its provisions).
24. See Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1198 (10th Cir. 2015) (finding that a
female employee’s job was substantially equal to a male employee’s job, and that job
differences that are not significant will not support a wage differential).
25. See id. at 1197-98 (finding the two jobs were similar enough to warrant equal
pay and the work performed was identical). But see Sprague v. Thorn Am. Inc., 129
F.3d 1355, 1364 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the court does not construe the equal
work requirement of the Equal Pay Act broadly).
26. See Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d at 725 (stating that employers cannot
confuse the purpose of the Equal Pay Act by calling for extra effort only occasionally,
or only from a few male employees).
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economic value commensurate with the pay differential, then the
differential is justified.27 However, the Tenth Circuit decided a case
concerning the duties of a secretary, and found that the secretary’s job was
not equal to the work done at the order desk.28 The court reasoned that
since the secretary was hired as a receptionist, since a significant portion of
her duties involved secretarial-receptionist work, and since only some of
the duties she performed were also performed by order desk employees, but
not as frequently, the work was not substantially equal.29
B. Circuit Splits Concerning Affirmative Defenses, Primarily “Factors
Other Than Sex”
An evaluation of the different circuits in relation to Equal Pay Act claims
proves that each circuit decides these cases differently. For example, the
Sixth Circuit found for employees 85 percent of the time, while the Seventh
Circuit only found for the employee 24 percent of the time.30 The varied
treatment of Equal Pay Act claims in each Circuit makes it confusing for
plaintiffs bringing these claims: the meaning of the Equal Pay Act and
precedent set out in major Supreme Court cases becomes misconstrued in
favor of the employer rather than using the Equal Pay Act to support
undercompensated employees.31
27. See id. (providing circumstances in which unequal pay would be justified); see
also Brennan v. S. Davis Cmty. Hosp., 538 F.2d 859, 863 (10th Cir. 1976)
(determining that both female aides and male orderlies were primarily involved in basic
patient care and that any differences in duties did not involve significantly greater
amounts of skill, effort, or responsibility).
28. See Nulf v. Int’l Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553, 561 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that
order desk employees engage in different jobs than secretaries, allowing for differences
in pay).
29. See id. (declaring that “it is the overall job, not its individual segments, that
must form the basis of comparison” (quoting Gunther v. County of Washington, 602
F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1979)).
30. See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass
Ceiling, 63 SMU L. REV. 17, 34 (2010) (noting that the Seventh and Eighth Circuits
have the most restrictive interpretation of the Equal Pay Act’s “equal work” prima facie
standard and are also the circuits that have the most liberal interpretation of the “factor
other than sex” affirmative defense).
31. See id. at 30 (lamenting that the final Equal Pay Act is not as strong as it needs
to be to combat wage discrimination by citing Representative Dent’s warning that
removing the “comparable work” standard would limit the Equal Pay Acts’
effectiveness); see also Winkes v. Brown Univ., 747 F.2d 792, 796 (1st Cir. 1984)
(finding that a female professor received an offer from a different institution and the
University had sought to match that offer to retain her by giving her a raise). But see
Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that when a male
employee came onto the job and his salary far surpassed plaintiff’s, the employer’s
justification of paying the new employee more to entice him to take the job in a
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As Corning Glass Works v. Brennan demonstrates, courts also struggle
with reconciling when a “factor other than sex” can and should be
addressed, what the term means, and what Congress intended it to mean.32
The Corning Glass Works court interpreted the meaning of the “factor
other than sex” affirmative defense as recognizing that the language of the
Equal Pay Act specifies many factors that may be used to measure the
relationships between jobs and a difference in pay, while other courts did
not reach the same conclusion.33 The court in Denman v. Youngstown State
University concluded that the pay differential of a female employee whose
contract was not renewed was not based on a “factor other than sex,”
thereby narrowing the factor other than sex defense in the Northern District
of Ohio.34 The same issue was also addressed in a Second Circuit case in
Aldrich v. Randolph Center School District, where a female employee was
being kept from a custodial position and pay grade because of a civil
service examination.35 The Ninth Circuit also addressed “factors other than
sex” in Maxwell v. City of Tucson and found that Congress added the
phrase to the Equal Pay Act as a “broad general exception” so that
employers would be able to implement gender-neutral job evaluations and
classification systems.36 However, the court found that the need must be
legitimate.37
competitive market was not legitimate).
32. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 202 (1974) (stating that
Congress incorporated words having a special meaning within the field regulated by the
statute so as to overcome objections that statutory definitions were vague).
33. See id. at 201 (finding that the most telling evidence of congressional intent of
the Equal Pay Act is the amended definitions of equal work; “skill,” “effort,”
“responsibility,” and “working conditions”).
34. See Denman v. Youngstown State Univ., 545 F. Supp. 2d 671, 678 (N.D. Ohio
2008) (stating that to be entitled to summary judgment, the defendant must prove that
no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether pay is due to a “factor other than
sex.” In this case the court found that a reasonable jury could determine that sex played
a role in the $10,000-$40,000 wage difference).
35. See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.2d 520, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that the job classification system did not show grounding in legitimate
business considerations and therefore was not a “factor other than sex,” and could not
be used as an affirmative defense to pay cleaners less than custodians, unless legitimate
business reasons could be shown).
36. See Maxwell v. City of Tucson, 803 F.2d 444, 447-48 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the City of Tucson failed to show how the reclassification of a woman’s position to
the lower level was based on a real change in duties and responsibilities when she was
actually directing a municipal program identical to that of her male predecessor, but at
a lower salary level).
37. See id. at 448 (determining that no legitimate need existed to pay a female
employee less because the jobs were identical).
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In the more employer friendly Seventh Circuit, the court found that a
proper job reclassification within the framework of a position and pay
classification system qualifies under the “factor other than sex” affirmative
defense.38 Through this defense, the employer is able to determine the
legitimate organizational needs and changes that the Ninth Circuit did not
find apparent in Maxwell v. City of Tucson.39 The Seventh Circuit also
found in Dey v. Colt Construction & Development Co., and Covington v.
Southern Illinois University that prior wages constitute as a “factor other
than sex” in Equal Pay Act claims, and therefore found that the employer
was justified in the salary disparity.40
C. Possibility Versus Plausibility
In one of the more recent Equal Pay Act cases concerning equal pay for
equal work, a group of female attorneys filed suit against their employer,
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, in an unsuccessful effort
to prove that the male attorneys were unfairly compensated at a higher pay
rate than the female attorneys.41 While the Second Circuit cited that the
lack of actual content of the work performed by the attorneys was the
reason for the dismissal of the claim, the court focused heavily on plausible
claim standards in an effort to prove that the EEOC did not meet its
pleading standard.42 The court continuously asserted that the EEOC did not
bring enough plausible information to assert a claim; however, the EEOC
alleged that the claimants and comparators had the same job code.43 The
38. See Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251, 1261-62 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that the employer’s reorganization was a legitimate reason for the pay
differential based on “factors other than sex”).
39. See id. (determining that finding against the employer would force employers
to either forego legitimate organizational planning, or to hire only someone of the same
sex whenever an employee left his or her job or was fired at a critical time).
40. See Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1449 (7th Cir. 1994)
(finding that although a male successor was paid more than his female predecessor,
prior wages counted as a “factor other than sex” under affirmative defenses for
employers); Covington v. S. Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding
that the Equal Pay Act does not preclude an employer from carrying out a policy
which, although not based on employee performance, has in no way been shown to
undermine the goals of the Equal Pay Act).
41. See E.E.O.C. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 252, 256 (2d Cir.
2014) (noting that while the EEOC carried out its investigation, nothing about the
actual content of the work done by the dozens of attorneys either within or across
practice areas at the Port Authority was addressed).
42. See id. at 253 (stating that Twombly and Iqbal require that a complaint support
the viability of its claims by pleading sufficient nonconclusory factual matter to set
forth a claim that is plausible on its face, not just simply possible).
43. See id. at 259 (holding that since the EEOC’s allegations were conclusory they
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EEOC also argued that the attorneys were paid within the bounds of an
attorney “maturity curve” based on years of legal experience, were
evaluated according to the same performance criteria, and were not limited
to distinct legal divisions.44 These arguments are valid when bringing an
Equal Pay Act claim and the EEOC’s case should not have been
dismissed.45
III. ANALYSIS
A. Circuit Splits Concerning Equal Pay Act Claims Should be Resolved by
Implementing a Broader Interpretation of the Equal Pay Act Because
There is a Lack of Consensus for Judges and Confusion on Equal Pay Act
Proceedings for Parties.
Patterns are developing across the decisions made in various federal
courts, and these decisions continue to conflict with one another.46 Often,
courts confuse the meaning of equal work, some ruling that work of
comparable character is suitable, while others state that equal work is not a
standard to be interpreted broadly.47 With confusion among circuits
pertaining to the definition of a word such as “equal”, it seems that courts
are purposefully confusing their parties so as to bar future Equal Pay claims
without giving a clear precedent as clarification.48 The result of such
actions unfairly leaves underpaid workers with no further recourse, and
employers are legally allowed to continue to pay certain employees less
did not meet the requisite level of facial plausibility).
44. See id. at 258 (finding that although the EEOC provided information regarding
the similarities of the attorneys’ jobs, it was not enough to bring a claim).
45. See id. at 254-55 (stating the prima facie elements of an Equal Pay Act claim).
46. See Denman v. Youngstown State Univ., 545 F. Supp. 2d 671, 677 (N.D. Ohio
2008) (establishing that an employee proved a prima facie case of sex-based pay
discrimination when females were not awarded raises, but equally situated male
workers were). But see Sprague v. Thorn Am. Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1364 (10th Cir.
1997) (holding that the employee did not demonstrate that she occupied substantially
the same position or performed substantially the same tasks as the assistant managers,
and therefore her Equal Pay Act claim failed).
47. See Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 723, 724-25 (5th Cir.
1970) (finding that although the employer contends that roles of orderlies and aides
were substantially distinguishable in terms of “secondary and tertiary” duties, the jobs
still reflected equal work because the duties were similar). But see Nulf v. Int’l Paper
Co., 656 F.2d 553, 561 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting that when significant amounts of time
are spent on different tasks the jobs are no longer considered equal).
48. See E.E.O.C. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 256 (2d Cir. 2014)
(stating that a three year investigation conducted by the EEOC still did not unearth any
relevant information pertaining to an Equal Pay Act claim, resulting in the case’s
dismissal).
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money than equally situated employees of a different gender because a
court refuses to speak on the direct definition of a word, but can quash a
case for failure to meet the definition of an undefined word.49
Courts also differ on the meaning of the phrase “factor(s) other than
sex,” which provides certain circuits with exceptions and broad catchalls
for employers seeking affirmative defenses in Equal Pay Act claims; for
example, in the Seventh Circuit in Covington v. Southern Illinois
University, the court states that “factors other than sex” were prevalent in
the case of a female assistant professor who was paid less than her male
predecessor because Southern Illinois University’s salary retention policy
happened to qualify as a policy other than sex.50
1. Congress and Circuits Should Follow the Fifth Circuit’s Meaning of
‘Equal Work,’ and Comparable Work Should be Added to that Definition to
Open Up the Possibilities of More Equal Pay Act Claims.
In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, the employer argued that the
opposing counsel failed to prove that the employer ever violated the Equal
Pay Act because day shift work was not performed under similar working
conditions as the night shift work.51 However, the court in Corning Glass
Works took into consideration four separate factors in determining job
value: skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions, which is very
similar to the congressional intent reflected in the Equal Pay Act itself.52
The Court decided that the day shift staffed by women who were paid less
was in fact equal to the night shift staffed by men who were paid more.53
At this juncture, the employer requested that the Court differentiate

49. See Nulf, 656 F.2d at 561 (stating that since Congress rejected the equal pay
for “comparable work” concept, it was then a substantial identity of job functions that
Congress sought to address, and not simply comparable skill and responsibility, which
the Act reads).
50. See Covington v. S. Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that
the Equal Pay Act does not preclude an employer from establishing a policy aimed at
improving employee morale when there is no evidence that the policy is either
discriminatorily applied, or has a discriminatory effect, even though discrimination is a
moot point in Equal Pay Act claims).
51. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201 (1974) (finding that
while a person not employed in the industrial business might assume that time of day
worked reflects one aspect of a job’s “working conditions,” the term has a different and
much more specific meaning in the language of industrial relations).
52. See id. (determining that “working conditions” in an industrial sense involves
two sub factors, surroundings and hazards).
53. See id. at 203 (stating that the day and night shift jobs in this instance are of
equal work considering surroundings and hazards).
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between jobs that the employer itself had always equated.54 Circuit courts
should replicate the Supreme Court’s approach to equal work because it
fairly drew conclusions between the employer’s own working condition
similarities and differences and evaluated those against the facts of the case
and the meaning of the Equal Pay Act.55 As Corning Glass Works
demonstrates, an employer cannot hide behind the guise of working
conditions as a reasonable excuse for a pay differential when every element
of the work performed is in fact equal, other than the time of day.56
The Court in Corning Glass Works also touched on Congress’ intent of
equal work, and the varying opinions from both the Second and Third
Circuits.57 While the Second Circuit found that shift differentials should be
excluded as a broad general exception for differentials in determining equal
work, the Third Circuit found that in comparing work of one employee to
the work of another, standing as opposed to sitting, pleasantness of
surroundings, periodic rest times, hours worked, and differences in shifts
should all be considered as part of the working condition factor when
determining pay.58 By imposing the logic used and the consensus reached
in Corning Glass Works, more courts could fairly evaluate Equal Pay Act
claims and have a distinct understanding of the meaning of “equal.”59
However, many courts are reluctant to incorporate this line of reasoning
and believe that the Equal Pay Act should not revert back to its previous
interpretation of equal, which meant work was comparable, or
“substantially equal,” in nature and working conditions.60

54. See id. at 204 (holding that the Equal Pay Act does allow for
nondiscriminatory shift differentials to influence pay rates).
55. See id. at 202 (finding that while there are many factors which may be used to
measure the relationship between jobs and a variance in wages, nowhere in any of the
employer’s definitions of working conditions is time of day stated as relevant to a
difference in pay).
56. See id. at 203 (holding that the performance of the inspection work by the
employees, whether day or night, is of equal character as defined by the Equal Pay
Act).
57. See id. at 198 (comparing the meaning of equal pay across different circuits).
58. See id. at 188 (noting that when the case had multiple branches in different
circuits before it was consolidated, the Second Circuit modified and found for the
employee, while the Third Circuit found for the employer).
59. See id. at 199 (commenting that at the conception of the Equal Pay Act, equal
pay for equal work was more readily stated in principle than reduced to statutory
language, and therefore was more malleable in definition and applicable to a broad
range of jobs).
60. See id. at 200 (indicating that courts criticized the beginning drafts of the
Equal Pay Act as “unduly vague and incomplete” as it related to the definition of equal
work).
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a. “Equal” Should be Interpreted as “Comparable,” via the Fifth
Circuit’s Reasoning.
The difficulty with defining the word “equal” was also addressed
correctly in City Stores, where the Fifth Circuit took care to evaluate the
job responsibilities of male and female clothing salespeople.61 The court
identified that both genders were responsible for marking and fitting
clothes as well as selling items to customers, and that the differences
between marking cuffs, crotches, and waistbands of men’s suits and
adjusting hemlines, shoulders and waists of women’s dresses were wholly
insubstantial.62 The employer argued that the jobs were different in nature,
but evidence in trial indicated that the employer knew otherwise.63 City
Stores emphasizes that restrictions apparent in the Equal Pay Act as
labeling jobs equal only when they are virtually identical are actually meant
to apply only to jobs that are substantially identical or equal, leading to the
definite possibility of confusion in interpreting the meaning of “virtually
identical” and “substantially identical.”64
The meaning of “equal” in Corning Glass Works leans much closer to
“substantially identical,” and therefore allows for a looser interpretation as
it was applied to the case.65 Although not identical to the decision in City
Stores, the Fifth Circuit defends its decision by asserting that legal
concepts, such as the definition of the word “equal” under the Equal Pay
Act, are predisposed to interpretation only through contextual study, and a
case-by-case basis.66 This idea of a case-by-case basis is both beneficial

61. See Brennan v. City Stores Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 237, 241 (5th Cir. 1973)
(explaining that the slightest of variations in job tasks does not eliminate the equality of
the job or call for a differential in pay).
62. See id. (finding when jobs entail the same fundamental work, but with
different descriptions, such as sewing men’s cuffs or women’s hemlines, the jobs are
still substantially equal).
63. See id. at 241 (describing that statements from the Administrator and the Labor
Department’s Interpretative Bulletin both took the position that the job of selling men’s
clothing was equal to selling women’s).
64. See id. at 238 (noting that when Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act, it
substituted the word “equal” for “comparable” to show that the jobs involved should be
very much alike, or closely related to each other; also construed as “virtually
identical”).
65. See id. at 237-38 (finding that the marking and fitting duties as well as the
sales responsibilities of the men and women at the store were of equal character, and
should therefore be compensated the same amount).
66. See id. at 239 (declaring that “semantic distinctions” such as “substantially
equal,” “essentially the same,” “sufficiently similar,” or “equivalent” do not indicate
that a court has applied an incorrect standard or definition of equality, especially as it
applied to comparing jobs at the store in question).
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and burdensome.67 It allows for a looser interpretation of the word “equal,”
which could help provide employees alleging unfair pay differentials more
success with passing the summary judgment stage and even eventually
winning cases; however, it simultaneously provides a source of confusion
for employees who are trying to understand the definition of a term that is
integral to the essence of their claim.68
The Fifth Circuit in Brookhaven General Hospital also addressed the
meaning of equal work when it determined that work is not equal in effort
if the job entails additional tasks which “(1) require extra effort, (2)
consume a significant amount of time from of all those whose pay
differentials are to be justified in terms of them, and (3) are of an economic
value commensurate with the pay differential.”69 The Fifth Circuit
properly applied this approach when it decided that similarly situated male
orderlies and female aides were unfairly paid different salaries because the
tasks performed, the responsibility given, and the skills necessary for both
positions were substantially equal.70 This method of approaching Equal
Pay Act claims is the most logical and straightforward; the Act itself calls
for equal pay for jobs that entail similar working conditions, as well as
equal skill, effort, and responsibility.71 The court also noted that the overall
controlling factor of the Equal Pay Act is job content, which is defined as
the actual duties that the employees are called upon to perform, not just the
job descriptions prepared by the employer.72 This line of reasoning helped
to push the aides’ case forward through summary judgment because the
court decided to rely on the testimony of the employees as to what their
daily tasks encompassed, leading to a more informative perspective of the
aides’ daily tasks, and giving insight into the equal skill, effort, and
67. See id. (dismissing any flaws with ambiguous terminology and allowing for
confusion regarding the meaning of “equal” to persist).
68. See Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 1970)
(holding that equal work calls for equal pay). Compare id. (finding that the work
performed by a male orderly is equal to that of a female aide), with Hodgson v. Good
Shepard Hosp., 327 F. Supp. 143, 143 (E.D. Texas 1971) (holding that a male orderly
position is not equal to a female aide and their pay should not be equal).
69. See Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d at 725 (providing the equal effort
criteria necessary to consider when evaluating an Equal Pay Act claim).
70. See id. at 723, 725 (noting that even the employer conceded that the duties
which occupied the better part of the time of both groups of employees demanded equal
skill, effort, and responsibility).
71. See id. at 722 (describing that the elements of an Equal Pay Act prima facie
case must be met prior to the merits of the case being evaluated).
72. See id. at 724 (illustrating that the testimony in this case established that some
aides did more than what was noted in their job description, which may or may not
fairly describe all that the job entails).
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responsibility of both gender’s positions.73
This method of investigation and understanding used by the Fifth Circuit
is necessary to hear Equal Pay Act claims that are brought to trial, and
allows for a larger number of cases to satisfy the prima facie standard,
making it possible for more women to assert Equal Pay Act claims without
being dismissed.74 The Fifth Circuit also noted that Equal Pay Act claims
should not be abandoned because a man’s bargaining power is greater than
a woman’s, resulting in the man earning more because he demanded it and
his employer granted it.75
b. Various Interpretations of ‘Equal’ in Relation to Equal Pay Act
Claims Must be Eliminated.
The ruling of a U.S. District Court in Texas, however, found that the jobs
of male orderlies and female aides were vastly different in skill,
responsibility, working conditions, and effort because of the various
additional tasks placed on the orderlies, making the pay differential
acceptable.76 Orderlies were distinguished as requiring a higher skill set for
being trained in male catheterizations, application and removal of casts,
correct methods of lifting patients particularly in critical, obese, or geriatric
patients, and sterile procedures.77 The court also found that orderlies were
required to demonstrate more effort in terms of lifting, handling equipment,
moving, turning, and transporting patients, and that these tasks were an
integral part of their daily work.78 The court also found that the orderlies’
responsibility was greater than that of the aides because an orderly works
throughout the hospital, including in emergency rooms, not just on a
designated floor, as the aides do.79 Lastly, the court found that orderlies
73. See id. at 725 (focusing on the individual tasks performed over and above
routine patient care, it became clear that the tasks performed only by aides required as
much skill as the most skilled tasks performed by orderlies, and that the additional
duties assigned to both groups involved ‘substantially equal’ responsibility).
74. See id. (determining that the trial judge was correct to not only place her
reliance on job descriptions provided by employers, but also on employee testimony).
75. See id. at 726 (asserting that the hospital’s argument that it paid orderlies more
because it could not get them for less is moot).
76. See Hodgson v. Good Shepard Hosp., 327 F. Supp. 143, 149 (E.D. Texas
1971) (holding that the evidence clearly established a substantial difference between
the position of aide and orderly so equal pay was not required).
77. See id. at 147 (noting that higher wages were acceptable for orderlies because
their skill set was more demanding).
78. See id. (justifying higher pay for orderlies because they exerted more effort).
79. See id. at 148 (demonstrating that the aide does not have substantially identical
and equal responsibilities to that of the orderly since the orderly has greater
responsibility in several areas of the job, specifically male catheterizations).
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had different working conditions than aides, and that the orderlies were
subjected to a more taxing and demanding work environment that entailed
disagreeable contact with the very ill, severely injured and dying, the
unruly and violent, and addicts.80
All of these reasons taken together seem to satisfy the point that orderlies
performed more tasks that consumed a significant amount of time, and thus
warranted a higher pay; therefore the definition of equal was appropriately
applied.81 However, discrepancy with laws cited in the Fifth Circuit
become prevalent in the court’s opinion when the court notes that the
frequency of these tasks being performed by orderlies can range anywhere
from once or twice a week to five times a day.82 Such a vast difference in
occurrence and timing of unequal tasks begins to question the validity of
how often they actually occur, and whether a higher pay is warranted.83
Although the court alluded to the expert testimony of qualified experts in
the field of Job Evaluation and Personnel Engineering, the facts provided
as to how frequently these extra tasks were performed were weak, the
holding drawn from them was conclusory, and more attention should have
been paid to the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation.84 Finally, the court noted
that it is not enough to simply show that the work done by both orderlies
and aides is similar or comparable: it must be substantially identical.85 This
reasoning creates a higher threshold for Equal Pay Act claims and results in
decisions for the employer since substantially identical work is very
difficult to prove.86
80. See id. (asserting that working conditions of such an unpleasant caliber were
rarely ever confronted by aides, and therefore additional pay for the orderlies was
permissible).
81. See Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 725 (5th Cir. 1970)
(holding that work is unequal if extra tasks are required that consume a significant
amount of time).
82. See Good Shepard Hosp., 327 F. Supp. at 148 (conceding that the extra work
performed by the orderlies is not conducted at identifiable times or places because the
additional work is not readily separable from the orderlies’ other job duties, but noting
that this should not matter and the tasks should not be considered incidental or
occasional).
83. See Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d at 725 (dictating that employers may
not misinterpret the Equal Pay Act so much as to call for extra effort only occasionally,
but still permit a wage discrepancy because extra effort is exerted sometimes).
84. See Good Shepard Hosp., 327 F. Supp. at 147 (noting that qualified experts
found, through surveys and investigation, that major differences existed between the
jobs of aides and orderlies).
85. See id. (holding that the work of orderlies and aides is not substantially
identical because the orderlies engage in more substantial work than the aides).
86. See Brennan v. City Stores Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1973)
(commenting that Congress’ change to the Equal Pay Act to replace “comparable” with
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In Brennan v. South Davis Community Hospital, both female maids and
aides brought an Equal Pay Act claim against their employer alleging that
the work of the female maids and aides was equal to the work of the male
orderlies and janitors, respectively.87 The Tenth Circuit applied the same
reasoning as the lower court, agreeing that employers should not be
allowed to skirt the proper meaning of the Equal Pay Act by drawing
“overly fine” distinctions in the tasks at issue.88 The court applied the logic
that higher pay is not related to extra duties when the extra task calls for a
marginal amount of time and is of small importance, when the extra duties
do not actually exist, or when employees of the opposite sex also perform
duties of equal skill, effort, and responsibility.89 A decision was made on
the grounds of “substantially equal,” rather than “identical,” and this
allowed the female maids and aides to prevail in their claim.90 The Tenth
Circuit’s logic resonates with that of the Fifth Circuit, and encourages
Equal Pay Act claims to survive dismissal, leaving open a broader meaning
of “equal” work.91 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits’ reasoning that jobs can be
compared on a lower threshold of equality is the kind of shift that the
Supreme Court should implement to encourage Equal Pay Act cases from
dismissal.92
Additionally, the court considered equal effort to mean similar “physical
or mental exertion” needed for the performance of a duty, rather than an
identical duty.93 The court determined that occasional or infrequent
performance of a duty that happens to require extra effort, either physically

“equal” altered the meaning of the bill and created a higher and more difficult threshold
to meet).
87. See Brennan v. S. Davis Cmty. Hosp., 538 F.2d 859, 863 (10th Cir. 1976)
(holding that the employer violated the Equal Pay Act because men and women were
not paid equal wages for equal work).
88. See id. at 861 (finding the employer’s extra task approach unfounded and
incorrectly applied to the facts of the case).
89. See id. at 862 (determining that the male orderlies’ extra duty of
catheterization needs to be evaluated as part of the entire job, just as maids encounter
extra duties).
90. See id. (stating that “[w]hen jobs are substantially equal, a minimal amount of
extra skill, effort, or responsibility cannot justify wage differentials”).
91. See id. at 863 (holding that both aides and orderlies were involved in basic
patient care and any differences in job duties did not involve significantly greater
amounts of skill, effort or responsibility).
92. See id. at 861 (commenting that the best approach for determining if work is
equal is a case-by-case analysis because different circumstances call for different
interpretations of the statute).
93. See id. at 864 (noting that although extra effort may be exerted in different
ways in two jobs, this does not allow for a difference in pay).
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or mentally, could not by itself justify unequal effort or unequal pay;
however, significant amounts of time spent on different tasks may not be
considered equal effort.94 Therefore, the occasional snow shoveling,
carrying of large garbage cans, filling of soda machines, and handling of a
larger floor cleaner did not call for a higher salary for the janitors than the
maids because the effort exerted through these activities was equal to the
effort the maids exerted in their own job duties.95 By allowing a more open
interpretation of “equal” rather than “identical,” the Tenth Circuit mirrored
the Fifth Circuit, and was able to effectively conclude that the similar work
done by female maids and aides was justifiably equal and deserving of the
same pay grade as their male janitor and orderly counterparts.96
The Tenth Circuit also decided Nulf v. International Paper Co., and the
court reached a different opinion as to the equality of work done by a
secretary in comparison to order desk employees.97 While the court noted
that equal work is not to be construed broadly, in the same paragraph it also
used the terms “substantially equal,” rather than identical, still keeping true
to its more liberal interpretation of equal work.98 Although the court’s
decision in Nulf seems counterintuitive in relation to Brennan v. South
Davis Community Hospital, the court reasoned that the secretary who
complained of unequal pay did not spend a significant amount of time
doing order desk tasks, and that her secretarial job consumed at least fifty
percent of her time.99 To further explain its logic, the court noted that even
if aspects of two jobs are similar, that is not enough to form a basis of
comparison for equal pay.100 This decision reflects Brennan v. South Davis
Community Hospital because it follows the logic that when significant
amounts of time are spent on different tasks, the jobs are inherently unequal
94. See id. (finding that all of the work performed by both the maids and janitors
was within the general cleaning function and minute variances in effort did not allow
for unequal pay).
95. See id. (finding that maids also did jobs the janitors did not, such as changing
drapes, cleaning bathrooms, stripping beds, cleaning mattresses, and making beds).
96. See id. at 860 (asserting that maids and aides should be equally compensated to
janitors and orderlies because the work done by each is equal).
97. See Nulf v. Int’l Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553, 560 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding that a
secretary was not erroneously paid less than desk order employees because their work
was not equal).
98. See id. (commenting on Congress’ disapproval of “comparable work” and
“like jobs,” but still allowing a “substantially equal” standard).
99. See id. (stating that because the complainant was spending half of her time on
non-order desk duties, it cannot be determined that her job was substantially equal to
the order desk job).
100. See id. at 561 (holding that the overall job is the only basis to be considered for
equal pay, not individual parts).
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and therefore do not necessarily require equal pay.101
Sprague v. Thorn Americas Inc., a case decided by the Tenth Circuit
after Nulf, continued to implement the “substantially similar” job
requirement in Equal Pay Act claims.102 A female secretary, Sprague, took
on additional responsibilities, including conducting meetings and updating
products; however, she did not receive a higher pay.103 While Sprague
argued that her employer paid males in positions similar to hers higher
wages, the court found that her job differed significantly from males in
other departments because her department produced less than one-tenth of
the revenues of the departments managed by the male assistant
managers.104 Since Sprague’s job duties entailed far less responsibility
than the male assistant managers given the smaller size of her department
and her position was that of a secretary, rather than an assistant manager,
her work was “merely comparable” rather than “substantially equal,” and
could not support an Equal Pay Act claim.105
Another case out of the Tenth Circuit, Riser v. QEP Energy, again
upheld the standard of “substantially equal” work being the basis for equal
pay.106 Riser, a female employee, sued her employer based on the
reasoning that younger men who took over job responsibilities very similar
to hers were paid higher wages than she was.107 While deciding the case,
the court acknowledged the importance of equal skill, effort, and
responsibility the jobs held, and that the determination of each element
must be based on the actual content of the job, not only the job description
101. See Brennan v. S. Davis Cmty. Hosp., 538 F.2d 859, 862 (10th Cir. 1976)
(noting that jobs that involve different tasks which consume substantial amounts of
time are not equal because the duties and responsibilities are more encompassing).
102. See Sprague v. Thorn Am. Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1365 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding
that a woman’s position was not “substantially equal” to that of the male assistant
managers).
103. See id. at 1364 (noting that these additional responsibilities were also
performed by Assistant Product Managers in other departments who received higher
wages).
104. See id. (reasoning that the difference in revenues between the departments
indicated that the tasks and functions performed by Sprague were dissimilar in level of
experience and level of complexity, rendering her job unequal to her male
counterparts).
105. See id. at 1365 (stating that the “equal work” requirement of the Equal Pay Act
should not be construed broadly so that failure to provide equal pay for “like jobs” is
not actionable).
106. See Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1198 (holding that job differences
that are “not significant in amount or degree will not support a wage differential.”)
(quoting S. Davis Comm. Hosp., 538 F.2d at 862).
107. See id. at 1194 (describing that Riser’s salary was $47,382 annually, while a
male Fleet Administrator was hired on at $62,000 annually).
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or title.108 This job content determination is the appropriate way to decide
the equality of the jobs and their pay because job titles and descriptions can
be misleading, whereas actual job duties portray the whole scope of the
job.109 Since the new jobs that were given to men with a higher pay
contained duties that were carved directly out of Riser’s own duties, the
court was correct in determining—regardless of Riser’s job description—
that Riser’s performance was equal to that of her male counterparts.110
Because a reasonable jury could find that Riser’s job was “substantially
equal” to both the Fleet Administrator and the Facilities Manager in skill,
effort, and responsibility, the Tenth Circuit, while following the logic of the
Fifth Circuit, correctly held that equal pay was required for Riser.111
The Third Circuit also addressed “equal work” in Shultz v. Wheaton
Glass Co., where male and female selector-packers were paid unequal
wages for the same work.112 The company’s employer attempted to defend
the wage differential on the fact that male employees had sixteen additional
tasks and also did the work of snap-up boys, making the jobs substantially
different.113 However, the court found that the male selector-packers only
spent eighteen percent of their total time on this work and the work was
forbidden to women.114 In addition, it was not found that every male
selector-packer performed the extra work; extra work was done by some
male selector-packers only when the extra sixteen tasks were not performed
by snap-up boys.115 The Third Circuit correctly found that even if all male
108. See id. (reasoning that simply because Riser’s job title was not “Fleet
Administrator” or “Facilities Manager” did not preclude her from equal pay for the
same work).
109. See id. (noting that Riser logged 541 hours of overtime in fleet administration
and facilities management duties, neither of which were in her job description or title).
110. See id. at 1197 (finding that Riser performed the entirety of fleetadministration tasks that were passed to a male employee with the title Fleet
Administrator).
111. See id. at 1198 (holding that QEP divided Riser’s position and assigned the
tasks she was performing to the two new positions, which were then filled by male
employees compensated at notably higher pay rates).
112. See Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding
that the male selector-packers earned twenty-one and a half cents per hour more than
females for equal work).
113. See id. at 262 (stating that additional tasks such as lifting more than thirty-five
pounds, stacking cartons, and locating glassware in the warehouse were performed by
men).
114. See id. at 263 (holding that there was no finding of fact as to what percentage
of time was spent by male selector-packers either on average or individually in
performing this different work).
115. See id. (finding that no basis exists for an assumption that all male selectorpackers performed any or all of these sixteen additional tasks).
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selector-packers did perform the sixteen additional tasks an inadequate
basis for the differential in wages paid to the male and female workers
would still exist.116 The court also determined that if some female selectorpackers were unwilling or unable to do the work of snap-up boys, then a
wage differential between the male and female workers might be
justified.117 However, the court found that this could also mean that there
may have been male selector-packers who were unwilling or incapable of
doing the work of snap-up boys, thereby removing any justification for the
wage differential.118
The Third Circuit correctly reasoned that the motive behind the
employer’s pay plans was to keep women in a subordinate role.119 While
evaluating the basis for the lower wages of the female selector-packers
compared to the males, the court turned to the wording of the Equal Pay
Act.120 The court found that the Equal Pay Act (as it was in 1970 and still
is today) provided inadequate guidance “in the construction of its
provisions in concrete circumstances.”121 The court addressed the history
of the Equal Pay Act and noted that Congress chose to specify equal pay
for “equal” work even though Congress was aware of the National War
Labor Board’s regulations from World War II that required equal pay for
“comparable” work.122 Equal pay for “comparable” work would set a
looser standard for Equal Pay Act claims and would allow more cases to
survive dismissal.123 However, Congress was not prepared to implement
such a standard.124 Instead, the court noted that Congress did not require

116. See id. (finding that the additional sixteen tasks were only justified at a pay
rate of two cents more per hour, rather than the twenty-one-and-a-half cents per hour
that male selector-packers were paid over the women selector-packers).
117. See id. at 264 (noting that no investigation as to whether the female selectorpackers could perform the work of snap-up boys ever transpired).
118. See id. (determining that simply because some of the male selector-packers
were willing and able to do the work of snap-up boys did not justify that all males
received twenty-one-and-a-half cents more per hour than all females).
119. See id. (inferring this by the 10 percent differential between male and female
selector-packers, and the two cents difference between snap-up boys and female
selector-packers).
120. See id. (noting that there are problems of construction with the Equal Pay Act
because terms are exceedingly ambiguous).
121. See id. at 265 (finding that at the time, the Equal Pay Act had not been
authoritatively construed by the Supreme Court).
122. See id. (determining that the National War Labor Board’s regulations were
only meant to show the feasibility of administering a federal equal pay policy).
123. See id. (holding that comparable work standards would give employees more
freedom in asserting Equal Pay Act claims).
124. See id. (noting the National War Labor Board’s decisions were not meant to be
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jobs to be identical, as some circuits may interpret the Equal Pay Act, but
only that jobs be substantially equal.125
c. Focus on Congress’ Intent of the Meaning of ‘Equal’ Should Also
be Taken into Consideration in Equal Pay Act Claims.
The Equal Pay Act was not fashioned to dispute entirely different jobs;
the assumption that differences would “necessarily be apparent” in various
job classifications was obvious, therefore warranting varied pay scales.126
However, the Third Circuit correctly states that Congress’ intention was not
to allow artificially created job classifications which did not substantially
differ from the genuine job classification to be an escape for employers.127
Therefore, the female selector-packers were correct in asserting that their
job classifications were very nearly identical, and at the least substantially
equal to the male selector-packers, and should have been compensated
equally.128
In Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., the Sixth Circuit decided that that male
orderlies were unfairly paid more than female aides.129 The orderlies were
engaged in a primarily male dominated training program and their
employer attempted to explain the unfair wage differential through the
training program.130 However, the court correctly found that the training
program was an illusory “post-event justification” for unequal pay for
equal work given the fact that most of the tasks the orderlies and aides
performed were substantially equal.131 Both the orderlies and aides
performed patient care as their primary job function, which included
bathing patients, distributing food trays, feeding, taking temperatures, and
guiding principles for the Equal Pay Act).
125. See id. (holding that any other interpretation of the Equal Pay act would
destroy its “remedial purposes” of eliminating gender wage discrepancies).
126. See id. (reasoning that when the Equal Pay Act was initially created, it was not
meant to equate unlike jobs, as they would be substantially different (or unequal) by
nature).
127. See id. at 265-66 (finding that such an allowance would render the content of
the Equal Pay Act useless).
128. See id. 267 (holding that no adequate findings exist that could be made to
support or justify the wage differential).
129. See Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 247 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that
justifications for unequal pay for equal work were illusory because the jobs were
substantially similar).
130. See id. at 251 (noting that training programs which appear to be available only
to employees of one sex, as is the case here, will be carefully examined to determine
whether such training programs are legitimate).
131. See id. at 251 (finding that the work of the nurse aides and orderlies consisted
primarily of the same tasks).
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changing clothes and bed linens.132 The employer contended that the work
of the orderlies and aides were not equal in accordance with the Equal Pay
Act, and therefore the unequal wages were justified.133 The employer
argued that male orderlies not only cared for patients, but they also
performed heavy lifting chores and that at least one orderly provided
security to an otherwise all female nightshift.134 The court rejected this
argument and found that female aides were also equally capable of the
heavy lifting that was required, and orderlies were simply there to provide
assistance with lifting if it was necessary, and most of the time it was
not.135 In addition, when an orderly performed security checks of the
premises, one or more aides generally accompanied him, proving that aides
were just as involved in work-related duties that were initially thought to
only pertain to men.136 Given the circumstances, the Sixth Circuit was
properly able to determine that the jobs performed by the aides and
orderlies were substantially equal because the tasks were very similar, and
each gender was capable and willing to perform them.137
Other courts could have construed the meaning of the Equal Pay Act
more narrowly; finding that the additional training, the necessity of having
a male orderly on duty for security, and the occasional additional tasks
warranted a higher pay for the male orderlies.138 An interpretation of that
sort would limit the number of Equal Pay Act claims that could be argued,
making a far stricter limitation on the equality of work, rather than just
“substantially” equal.139 Since the Sixth Circuit found that the jobs

132. See id. at 249 (commenting on the fact that orderlies bathed less numerous
male patients, the nurse’s aides bathed more numerous female patients, and orderlies
performed additional tasks that aides performed when no orderly was available).
133. See id. at 250 (describing Nucare as contending that the primary and only duty
of the aides was patient care, although it is conceded that patient care also was the
primary duty of the orderlies).
134. See id. at 250 (noting that testimony of the orderlies asserted that they did little
or nothing that the aides did not do).
135. See id. at 251 (indicating that aides and orderlies helped each other perform the
same tasks).
136. See id. (suggesting that this extra task that was given as a reason for an
increased wage for male orderlies was an illusory cover up, since female aides
accompanied the orderlies).
137. See id. (finding that additional duties are either too insubstantial in amount or
too inconsistently assigned, and therefore the two jobs were equal).
138. See id. at 250 (indicating that one of the most frequently litigated questions is
whether additional small tasks require the necessary effort to make the jobs
substantially unequal).
139. See id. (noting that the issue of equality of work must be resolved by an overall
comparison of the work, not its individual segments).
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performed by the male orderlies were also as effectively and frequently
performed by female nurse’s aides, the court correctly evaluated the
meaning of “substantially equal” work, which mirrored Congress’ intent.140
2. Congress and Circuits Should Come to a Consensus on the Meaning of
“Factors Other Than Sex” Because the Phrase is Interpreted as a Catchall
for Employers, Where Instead it Should be Narrowly Monitored as it is in
the Second Circuit.
“Factors other than sex” were addressed in Belfi v. Prendergast, where a
female Long Island Railroad employee was paid significantly less than her
male peers.141 The Second Circuit noted that under the Equal Pay Act,
although a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case, she does not need to
prove a discriminatory animus on her employer’s part.142 The employer’s
four possible affirmative defenses include (1) a seniority system; (2) a
merit system; (3) a system which measures earning by quantity or quality
of production; or (4) a differential based on any factor other than sex.143
Both the Sixth and Second Circuits have held that the “factor other than
sex” defense “does not include literally any other factor, but a factor that, at
a minimum, was adopted for a legitimate business reason.”144
After an employer identifies an affirmative defense, the plaintiff may
counter it by producing evidence that the reasons the defendant seeks to
advance are actually a pretext for sex-discrimination, as the employee in
Belfi did.145 The employer asserted a combination of seniority and “factors
other than sex” to explain the wage differential between the female railroad
employee and her male peers.146 However, the Second Circuit found that
140. See id. (determining that Congress did not intend through the use of the words
“equal work” that the jobs must be identical).
141. See Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the employer’s reasons for pay
disparity were pretextual).
142. See id. at 135 (noting that the Equal Pay Act allows employers four affirmative
defenses, and that the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove the disparity
is justified by one of the defenses).
143. See id. at 136 (clarifying that to successfully establish a “factor other than sex”
defense “an employer must also demonstrate that it had a legitimate business reason for
implementing the gender-neutral factor that brought about the wage differential”).
144. See id. (quoting EEOC v. J.C. Penny Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988)
holding that the “factor other than sex” defense cannot be used as a catchall for
employers).
145. See id. at 133, 139 (describing that the employee claims she was underpaid
from 1989 to 1994 compared to her male peers).
146. See id. at 136 (claiming the gender-neutral application of the Salary Plan as a
“factor other than sex”).
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when the burden of persuasion shifted back to the employee to show that
the employer’s explanations were a pretext for gender-based
discrimination, the court sided with the employee.147 First, the court
determined that the female employee was not paid a new minimum salary
for the position that she held.148 Second, a new male employee was paid
more than a female employee, and seniority was given as the
explanation.149 Third, the seniority system was not found to be a legitimate
explanation.150
The Second Circuit correctly determined that the employer had a
different, and improper, justification for every reason why its female
employee was paid less than her male counterpart.151 The court reasoned
that the employer’s use of polices in the employee’s case were unfair
because they did not relate to a legitimate business purpose, and left the
employee with no way to approach or remedy the obvious wage
discrepancy.152 While the employer asserted “factors other than sex” as a
defense, the Second Circuit correctly concluded that a trier of fact could
rationally find that the wage discrepancy was motivated by gender-based
discrimination.153 The outcome of this case proves that “factors other than
sex” defenses are not meant to be all encompassing, and to allow overly
broad definitions of the defense would unfairly preclude employees from
bringing claims.154
The employer in Aldrich v. Randolph Central School District attempted
to justify a wage differential between female cleaners and male custodians
by the necessity of a civil service examination.155 The employer asserted
147. See id. at 138 (finding three reasons that prove genuine issues of material fact
exist regarding the pretext).
148. See id. (noting the railroad’s own rule that an employee hired or promoted to a
given position should normally be paid the position’s minimum salary).
149. See id. (finding that the new male employee had no seniority over the female
employee because he was employed after her, yet he was paid more).
150. See id. at 138-39 (finding that the seniority rule was not a bar to equal pay for
male employees doing the same work).
151. See id. at 139 (describing explanations to include lack of seniority, the
employee not meeting guidelines for an inequity increase, and the employer’s need to
attract union workers to management).
152. See id. (holding that the employee raised genuine issues of material fact that
made it clear the employer was discriminating based on gender).
153. See id. (indicating that circumstantial evidence raises questions of fact that
may lead a jury to find that the employer also unreasonably applied its policies due to
gender).
154. See id. (concluding that summary judgment is inappropriate where “factors
other than sex” are being utilized as an overly broad defense).
155. See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.2d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 1992)
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that the civil service examination and classification system was a “factor
other than sex” and therefore was a legitimate affirmative defense.156 In
this case, the Second Circuit again properly analyzed the most effective
way to determine what “factors other than sex” are in Equal Pay Act
Claims.157 The court determined that the language of the statute recognized
many factors that may be used to measure the relationships between jobs
and pay disparity, but these factors must be bona fide.158 The court found
that the civil service examination the employers asserted was not enough to
stand as a “factor other than sex” as it was only a gender-neutral
classification system.159 While evaluating the facts of the case, the court
asserted that Congress’ intent was not that an employee would lose an
Equal Pay Act claim after making out a prima facie case of wage
discrimination simply because the employer chose to “call one employee a
cleaner and another employee a custodian.”160
The Second Circuit noted that in the instant case, the employer never
proved that the job classification system (i.e., the civil service examination)
had any grounding in legitimate business considerations, and therefore it
cannot be a “factor other than sex.”161 To show any possibility that the
civil service examination qualifies as a “factor other than sex,” the Second
Circuit correctly held that the employer must prove that the exam for
custodians and the practice of filling the custodian’s position only from
among the top three scorers on the exam are related to performance of the
custodian’s job; doing otherwise would allow for a catchall interpretation
of the defense.162 If the employer can prove that the exam justifies the
(indicating that the custodian position is a competitive position under civil service rules
and applicants must take an examination to be eligible for the job).
156. See id. at 522-23 (noting that the female employee who brought the Equal Pay
Act claim was never a top scorer on the examination).
157. See id. at 524 (declaring that Congress specifically rejected “blanket assertions
of facially-neutral job classification systems” as a “factor other than sex” defense).
158. See id. at 525 (noting that “only a ‘bona fide job classification program’ where
job-related distinctions underlie the classifications will qualify as a ‘valid defense to a
charge of discrimination’”).
159. See id. (stating that when a differential in pay is rooted in business-related
differences in work responsibilities and qualification, then it may be a “factor other
than sex”).
160. See id. (commenting that such an affirmative defense would provide “a gaping
loophole in the statute” through which pretexts for discrimination would be permitted).
161. See id. at 526-27 (finding that the district court erred by allowing the
employer’s classification system as “literally a “factor other than sex”“).
162. See id. at 527 (expressing that a female employee was doing custodian’s work
and being paid less than male custodians under the guise that the civil service
examination allows it).
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wage differential because the exam is job-related, then the affirmative
defense may stand.163 However, the employer had only asserted the
defense of a “factor other than sex” without any support as to the impact of
the exam on job performance.164
The reasoning of the Second Circuit was also implemented in the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Maxwell v. City of Tucson, where the court properly
applied the same “factor other than sex” analysis in the case of a municipal
employee who accepted a program director’s position at a reduced salary
and then alleged sex-based wage discrimination against the municipality.165
The major question in the case was whether the employer sustained its
burden of proving one of the exceptions to the Equal Pay Act, and the court
found that it did not.166 While the Ninth Circuit found that other circuits
have differed on which job classifications qualify under the “factor(s) other
than sex” defense, the proper application of the standard entails legitimate
business purposes for the reclassification.167 The court determined that the
City failed to meet its burden of proof because the employee presented
evidence that the duties and responsibilities of her position had actually
increased, while her wages decreased, proving that a finder of fact could
logically conclude that the wage disparity was not supported by an
affirmative defense.168
The Seventh Circuit in Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium analyzed
“factors other than sex” in a less fair and more employer-friendly way.169
The female employee’s male successors, who performed substantially
163. See id. (articulating that a “factor other than sex” may only be asserted as a
defense if there is a legitimate business reason, otherwise the defense is simply
discriminatory).
164. See id. (holding that since factual issues exist in regards to the civil service
examination’s relation to job performance, summary judgment for the employer was
improperly granted).
165. See Maxwell v. City of Tucson, 803 F.2d 444, 444 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that
the municipality failed to establish a “factor other than sex” defense to Equal Pay Act
allegations).
166. See id. at 447-48 (illustrating that the primary purpose of the “factor other than
sex” was to permit employers to utilize bona fide gender-neutral job evaluation and
classification systems).
167. See id. at 445 (noting that the city claimed the reclassification of the job from
Director to Administrator justified lower wages because the work load had decreased,
therefore falling under the “factor other than sex” defense).
168. See id. at 447-48 (describing that legitimate organizational needs would be
permitted as a “factor other than sex;” however, in the instant case, the evidence shows
no organizational needs or changes to explain the wage disparity).
169. See Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251, 1261-62 (noting
that the employee’s evidence did not establish Equal Pay Act violations because the
restructuring was considered a plausible affirmative defense).
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equal work as the female employee, were paid higher salaries when they
took over her position, but the Seventh Circuit did not find this to be a
violation of the Equal Pay Act.170 The court incorrectly reasoned that
because the reorganization plan was implemented after the female
employee left her position, it did not mean the employer would not have
been willing to pay the female employee a higher salary had she stayed in
her position.171 The court neglected the fact that the reorganization and the
higher wages were only implemented after the departure of the female
employee, and refused to condemn such actions as sex discrimination.172
By allowing the employer to use the “factor other than sex” catchall
excuse, the Seventh Circuit allowed unequal wages to be legally justified
by reasoning that employers have the right to change and revise the jobevaluation and pay systems they implement.173 While the Seventh Circuit
raises important points about the need for employers to be able to
implement change in their workforce, a reading of “factors other than sex”
that is closer to the analysis in the Second Circuit would have provided a
less employer biased outcome, and would have reduced the catchall
interpretation of the defense.174
The Seventh Circuit in Dey v. Colt Construction & Development Co.
again misapplied the “factor other than sex” defense.175 The court referred
to the “factor other than sex” defense as a catchall exception that
“embraces an almost limitless number of factors, so long as they do not
involve sex,” and did not find it unfair or illegitimate to leave a large
loophole for employers to pass through.176 While the Second Circuit finds
170. See id. at 1261 (finding that because the position and pay changes were based
on a long-term reorganization plan, they are allowable as “factors other than sex”).
171. See id. (noting that the reorganization was already planned for because it was
discussed prior to the female employee’s departure, and the plan would have been
implemented with or without the departure of the female employee).
172. See id. (holding that the court is barred from finding an Equal Pay Act
violation in the absence of some reason to connect the change in personnel to the
implementation of the new plan).
173. See id. (determining that a holding of the contrary would be to force employers
either to “forego legitimate organizational planning or to hire only someone of the
same sex whenever an employee left a job at a critical time”).
174. See id. 1261-62 (holding that there is little reason to question that the
reorganization was a legitimate reason for the pay differential based on “factors other
than sex;” how this allows too large a loophole in the Seventh Circuit).
175. See generally Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1449 (7th Cir.
1994) (finding that the pay disparity was based on a “factor other than sex” although
themes of sex discrimination existed).
176. See id. at 1462 (noting that it is not the court’s place to second-guess the
employer’s business judgment).
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it important to assert that there must be a legitimate business reason for the
“factor other than sex” defense, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly concluded
that the factor only needs to be bona fide, and that the factor must not be
discriminatorily applied or have a discriminatory effect.177 In the instant
case, this logic allowed the employer to pay a lower wage to its female
employee, while paying a male employee in the same position a higher
wage.178 Although a more advanced degree may in some situations justify
higher wages, the Seventh Circuit did not require, or question, whether the
higher degree related to legitimate business reasons for the pay
discrepancy, therefore allowing a potentially facially discriminatory pay
practice to continue without further investigation.179
B. The Prima Facie Elements of an Equal Pay Act Claim Should
Not be Hindered by the Issue of Possibility Versus Plausibility
Because it Bars Claims.
The Second Circuit, while providing useful guidance on how to analyze
“factors other than sex,” recently issued a decision in E.E.O.C. v. Port
Authority of N.Y. & N.J. that seriously hinders the ability of claimants to
bring an Equal Pay Act claim.180 While the female attorneys pled their
claim and brought evidence sufficient to prove that they were unfairly paid
less than the male attorneys at the Port Authority, the court still concluded
that the information was not adequate to find a violation of the Equal Pay
Act.181 The court’s continued concern with the EEOC’s making of “broad
generalizations” when comparing the work done by female and male
employees lead the court to incorrectly decide that the claim may have
been possible, but was not plausible.182
177. See id. (commenting that the court cannot question the company’s decision to
pay more for an advanced degree belonging to a man when there is no evidence that it
paid women with similar degrees a lesser amount).
178. See id. (determining the “factor other than sex” defense was justified because
the male employee had more advanced business degrees and the employer had initially
offered the male employee less money, but then the salary was negotiated up).
179. See id. at 1464 (noting that the court is convinced the male employee’s higher
salary was unrelated to his sex).
180. See generally E.E.O.C. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 248-49 (2d
Cir. 2014) (dismissing the case on the basis that despite years of discovery, nothing
about the actual content of the work done by the female attorneys was provided).
181. See id. at 256 (finding that the EEOC alleged all claims of unequal work for
equal pay in a conclusory fashion, therefore providing no basis for the claims).
182. See id. at 257-58 (detailing all of the evidence found through discovery to be
unreasonable inferences, even though the EEOC found comparators, similarly situated
employees, and evidence that the pay disparity was not explained by “factors other than
sex”).
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For every argument the EEOC made, the Second Circuit had a reason for
why all of the testimony and evidence was not sufficient enough to bring an
Equal Pay Act claim.183 The EEOC determined that the same professional
degree and admission to the bar was necessary for both female and male
sexes, as well as the same physical and mental exertion, the same degree of
accountability and supervision, and even the same work location.184
However, the court ruled that this was all general and broad information
that did not prove the work performed by the attorneys was equal.185 The
court relied heavily on analysis from Twombly and Iqbal, stating that a
complaint must support the “viability of its claims by pleading sufficient
nonconclusory factual matter to set forth a claim that is plausible on its
face.”186 The court conceded that the equal work inquiry does not demand
evidence that a plaintiff’s job is “identical to a higher-paid position, but that
the standard is nonetheless demanding,” and it must be proved that the jobs
compared are “substantially equal.”187 The EEOC identified 338 pairs of
claimants that shared similar bar admission dates and years of service, who
worked in the same division at the same time, yet the Second Circuit did
not find this information plausible for an Equal Pay Act claim.188 Despite
evidence to the contrary, the court reasoned that the EEOC’s allegations
read as nothing more than a claim that suggests the “sheer possibility” that
the Port Authority violated the Equal Pay Act.189 The Second Circuit’s
failure to explicitly state what would have been considered a plausible
pleading leaves both complainants and other circuits in confusion and
without a legitimate example to base future claims on.190 The EEOC

183. See id. at 250 (stating that even though the EEOC compared dates of bar
admission, dates of service with the Port Authority, salaries, and divisions to prove the
pay discrepancy, the court was still unconvinced by the plethora of evidence).
184. See id. at 250-51 (revealing that the EEOC found many similarities between
female and male attorneys detailing why they should be compensated equally).
185. See id. at 256 (noting that the complainant did not allege “enough facts to state
a claim for relief that is plausible on its face”).
186. Id. at 253 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
(noting that a complaint offering “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do”).
187. See id. at 255-56 (determining that the EEOC’s bald recitation of the elements
of an Equal Pay Act claim and its assertion that the attorneys at issue held “the same
job code” are plainly insufficient to support a claim).
188. See id. at 256 (stating that the EEOC failed to demonstrate that all Port
Authority attorneys perform “substantially equal” work).
189. See id. at 258-59 (commenting that the EEOC has alleged, at most, that some
female nonsupervisory attorneys were paid less than some male nonsupervisory
attorneys at the Port Authority).
190. See id. at 258 (holding that the EEOC’s pleadings cannot be said to contain
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provided substantial evidence as to a violation of the Equal Pay Act, yet the
Second Circuit refused to review this information, instead claiming that the
EEOC did not bring enough facts or provide enough focused information,
without providing in its analysis what a proper claim with plausible
evidence would look like.191
IV. CONCLUSION
Bringing an Equal Pay Act claim has become more challenging in recent
years as pleading standards have been analyzed with stricter scrutiny.192
Because of higher pleading standards and circuit courts that have continued
to find in favor of employers, employees have recently discovered that
challenging wage disparity is a far more difficult task than it should be.193
If circuit courts could come to a consensus concerning pleading standards,
prima facie elements, and the affirmative defenses of Equal Pay Act claims,
judges and complainants would have a clearer understanding of what the
law calls for, making it easier to state a valid claim.194
More specifically, the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and Congress
should implement the Fifth Circuit’s correct interpretation of equal work.195
Comparable work should also be placed back into the definition of equal
work so that more Equal Pay Act claims would be allowed in courts,
moving the equal work standard closer to “substantially equal,” and closer
to the Fifth Circuit’s reading of the definition.196 The “factor other than

enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
illegality).
191. See id. at 259 (finding that the EEOC has not plausibly plead that the pay
differentials existed despite the attorney’s performance of “substantially equal” work,
and therefore, without any nonconclusory allegations to support the claim, the EEOC’s
complaint was properly dismissed).
192. See id. at 256 (finding that broad statements are not enough to bring an Equal
Pay Act claim because factual assertions must be present and well-grounded in the
basis of the complaint).
193. See id. (holding that the complaint of wage disparity was properly dismissed
even though plaintiffs brought years’ worth of collected evidence to prove the unjust
wages).
194. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 202 (1974) (stating that
Congress incorporated words having a special meaning within the field regulated by the
statute so as to overcome objections that statutory definitions were vague).
195. See Brennan v. City Stores, Inc. 479 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding
that the standard for “equal work” is higher than mere comparability, but lower than
absolutely identical).
196. See Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 199 (noting that the comparable
standard was more readily used in the earlier years of the Equal Pay Act, but has since
been eliminated to the detriment of Equal Pay Act claims).
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sex” defense should also be more narrowly tailored and defined in the way
the Second Circuit has derived meaning from it: using it as a legitimate
reason for differences in pay, rather than a catchall for employers to find
excuses to pay male employees more than females.197 Failure to reach a
consensus on the meaning of equal work, the meaning of “factors other
than sex,” or the appropriate pleading standard for Equal Pay Act claims
could mar the purpose of the statute, and prevent women from obtaining
the wages they are entitled to.198

197. See Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating that when a differential in pay is rooted in business-related differences in work
responsibilities and qualification, then it may be a “factor other than sex”).
198. See Sprague v. Thorn Am. Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1364 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating
that the “equal work” requirement of the Equal Pay Act should not be construed
broadly, and therefore failure to provide equal pay for “like jobs” is not actionable).
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